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Abstract
The epistemology of computer simulations has become a mainstream
topic in the philosophy of technology. Within this large area, signifi-
cant differences hold between the various types of model and simulation
technologies. Agent-based and multi-agent systems simulations introduce
a specific constraint in the types of agents and systems modelled. We
argue that such difference is crucial and that simulation for the artificial
sciences requires the formulation of its own specific epistemological princi-
ples. We present a minimally committed epistemology which relies on the
methodological principles of the Philosophy of Information and requires
weak assumptions on the usability of the simulation and the controllabil-
ity of the model. We use these principles to provide a new definition of
simulation for the context of interest.
1 Introduction
Computer simulations play an essential role in many scientific enterprises, from
engineering to geography, from biology to social sciences, supporting research
and even determining breakthroughs. In the last two decades, this increas-
ingly impactful role has been considered by philosophers of science interested
in establishing epistemological principles of computer simulations and in draw-
ing comparisons with the classic scientific method. Here and in the following
the term epistemological foundation refers to a set of epistemological principles
and methodological requirements formulated to qualify, clarify and guide the
practice within a scientific field. One of the main issues in establishing an epis-
temological foundation for computer simulations is their variety in technology
and applicability: in this respect, the analyses developed for equation-based sim-
ulation may differ from those required to analyse Monte-Carlo or agent-based
simulations. This debate1 only recently focused on the use of agent-based sim-
ulations and their specific technical and methodological problems. Moreover,
1The literature on this topic is usually referred to as starting with [8].
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even within the specific approach of agent-based simulations, the application
considered may require different characterisations.
Agent-based modelling and the accompanying computer simulations are used
in a large variety of fields, and for several distinct aims. What makes this tech-
nique so vastly applicable is its simplicity of use and adaptability. Economics,
population analysis, natural and environmental sciences, and biology have all
been supported by agent-based modelling and simulation via computers. Agent-
based models are usually presented in the literature as mimicking the behaviour
of natural agents in naturally occurring environments. On the other hand,
multi-agent systems (MAS) refer to agents defined in simulation to create and
act in novel artificial environments. Here one typically refers to artificial agents,
with applications especially in robotics. Nonetheless, it is common to provide a
general characterisation of agents to accommodate both applications:2
• Autonomy : agents are autonomous information processing and exchanging
units, free to interact with other agents;
• Heterogeneity : agents may have different properties and be grouped ac-
cording to similar characteristics;
• Active: agents are goal-directed, reactive, endowed with (bounded) ratio-
nality, interactive, mobile, adaptive, with a form of memory or learning;
• Interdependence: agents influence others in response to the influence that
they receive, or indirectly through modification of the environment.
While the definition of agent is shared, the distinction between natural and
artificial agents is crucial. Agent-based modelling intends to create a plausible
model of an existing system, often with explanatory purposes; this environ-
ment has some given properties and the agents coordinate and relate with those
properties. This is the case for the natural and social sciences, using simulations
to discover and predict new information about systems of which we have only
partial knowledge. Multi-agent systems, on the other hand, aim often at the
creation of an entirely new model, definition and implementation of protocols:
these models have mostly exploratory purposes. This is the case for the sciences
of the artificial, like robotics and network theory. Despite this difference might
appear obvious at first sight, the implications for the corresponding epistemo-
logical foundations are extensive, and they have been neglected so far in the
philosophical literature. The aim of the present contribution is to provide such
a reflection on the epistemological foundation of MAS, or simulations for the
2For definitions of agents including these properties see for example [3, p.87] and [17, p.146].
Note that it is possible to argue that the following characterization of agents presents at least
some overlapping with the definition of agents in other contexts, e.g. in game-theoretical anal-
yses, although the latter would typically have stronger constraints like perfect rationality. The
arguments presented in the following of this contribution rely strongly on the methodological
principles underlying the simulation processes in which these agents are involved, their be-
haviour analysed and conclusions drawn, rather than on whether the assumed properties of
agents are exclusive of Agent-based modelling and MAS.
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sciences of the artificial like network theory and robotics. Our claim is that for
this specific area of study, we can define a robust minimalist epistemology.3
The remaining of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
overview some of the literature on the Epistemology of Computer Simulation
in general and of agent-based simulation in particular. In Section 3 we briefly
overview some example uses of computer simulations, to extract some observa-
tions to guide the formulation of relevant epistemological principles. In Section
4 we approach our task from the point of view of the relation between artifi-
cial models and their implementation. In Section 5 we accomplish this task,
by showing that such an epistemological foundation is already available in the
larger setting of the Philosophy of Information. We use the resulting analysis
to formulate a definition of simulation in the context at hand.
2 Some positions in the literature
The epistemology of simulation methods has received large attention in the last
few decades,4 and so has their relation with computer experiments and their
epistemological nature in relation with laboratory practices.5
A first issue at stake is the definition of simulation. A broad sense of this
notion is referred to by Frigg and Reiss:
“In the broad sense, ‘simulation’ refers to the entire process of con-
structing, using, and justifying a model that involves analytically
intractable mathematics [...] Following Humphreys, we call such a
model a ‘computational model’.”6
Within this setting, the authors argue notoriously against the following claims:
• Metaphysical Claim: Simulations create some kind of parallel world in
which experiments can be conducted under more favorable conditions than
in the real world.
• Epistemological Claim: Simulations demand a new epistemology.
• Semantic Claim: Simulations demand a new analysis of how models/theories
relate to concrete phenomena.
• Methodological Claim: Simulating is a sui generis activity that lies ‘in
between’ theorizing and experimentation.
3The validity of this analysis for the simulation of natural agents should be put under strict
scrutiny and shall not be considered here.
4See in particular [12, 11, 14].
5See respectively [10, 18, 26] and [1, 23]. For a brief overview of several debates concerning
the epistemology of computer simulations at large, see [4].
6See [8]. The reference to Humphreys is to [14, pp. 102–104].
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According to this view, simulation does not offer more favourable conceptual
results than experiments; it does not need to be explained and guided method-
ologically in any different way than standard scientific enterprises; it does not
present a different relation between model and theory, and its methodological
nature is not any more complex than what scientific practice knows from the
standard theory-experiment relation. This position can be considered at one
end of a conceptual spectrum: it maintains that computer simulations do not
offer, from the epistemological viewpoint, any novelty when compared with stan-
dard experimental practices in the sciences. In doing so, we are looking at the
relation between the computational model underlying the simulation and the
corresponding mathematical or theoretical template abstracted from reality.7
An intermediate position on the relation between standard scientific knowl-
edge and practice based on computer simulations can be characterised as follows:
“[Computer simulation] carries with it problems, techniques and meth-
ods which are clearly new, such as debugging methods. [...] The
difficulties with sorting out the epistemology of experimental science
are not yet adequately resolved; but there is no reason to believe that
that epistemology won’t have rich enough resources to accommodate
what scientists are today doing with their computers.”8
This position relies on a homomorphic relation between simulation and the
simulated process: the latter is at the outset of the scientific research, the former
is conceptually posterior to it. Under this assumption, computer simulation
requires some specific epistemological characterization, representing a variant of
standard experimental sciences. This status is justified by some characteristics:
• Visualization: according to this view, the process of setting up an exper-
iment in a standard scientific setting and observing the behaviour of the
system under given initial conditions has analogies with the practice of
observing a simulated system through the use of visualization techniques
dealing with massive amount of data (number of agents, environment con-
ditions and so forth); obviously, under this reading, analytical tools miss
this aspect because no observational process is involved in the resolution
of equations providing predictions for a given model.
• Approximation: distortions are true of any scale model and, more gen-
erally, of any physical system not strictly identical to the target system;
in this sense, a simulation approximates the reality of the simulated sys-
tem in a manner comparable to the approximation of experiments in the
standard scientific practice.
• Discretization: in a real-world experiment, both the experimental and tar-
get processes may well both be continuous processes, but the experimenter
will use them (in either manipulation or observation) only with some finite
degree of error.
7See [12, pp. 499–500].
8See [16, Section 6].
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• Calibration: calibration in simulation serves the same purpose as in a
physical experiment, of finding the settings to support previously observed
measurements of a target system under given initial conditions.
These aspects shared by simulations and experiments are related to the pro-
cess of verification, i.e. the act of determining whether the simulation correctly
implements the theory being investigated, requiring processes like design ver-
ification, debugging, and consistency checks.9 In conclusion, experimentation
with computer simulations is ‘full-blooded experimentation’, but it also shows
new problems related to the techniques in use and it is moreover limited by
computability theory, rather than by physical limits.
On the opposite side of the conceptual spectrum we find the position main-
taining that computer simulations are a true novelty with respect to standard
experimental science, with which it has only a metaphorical or analogical rela-
tion:
“computer simulations often use elements of theories in constructing
the underlying computational models and they can be used in ways
that are analogous to experiments”.10
According to this position, simulation offers major epistemological novelties
compared to other experimental approaches:
• Epistemic Opacity : a process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive
agent X at time t just in case X does not know at t all of the epistemically
relevant elements of the process; this is to say that within simulation a
specific set of variables is chosen and the methodological validity of the
process is confined to such limited set of elements, other aspects and their
influence remaining inaccessible to the investigation;
• Semantics: the way in which simulations are applied to systems is different
from the way in which traditional models are applied: while the latter ones
are required to denote the model of reality under analysis, in simulation
the relation is less rigid and proceeds more by approximation;
• Temporal Dynamics: while in a traditional scientific setting one requires a
temporal representation of the dynamical development of the system under
observation, in the case of simulations there is additionally a temporal
process involved in actually computing the consequences of the underlying
model, thus inducing a different, over-imposed temporal dynamics;
• Practice: finally, the computational setting in which simulations occur, il-
lustrates a separation between what can be computed in theory and what
can be computed with the available resources; this aspect must be con-
sidered also in the opposite direction, with computational means allowing
more than what the system of reference can.
9See [16, Section 4.2].
10See [15, p.625].
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With respect to the problem of epistemic opacity, the level of knowledge that the
cognitive agent X can exhibit with respect to the epistemically relevant elements
of the process can vary, depending on the level of access and competence that
X has with the implementation, and in particular depending on whether X is
the designer, the programmer or only the user. This analysis can be better
formulated by qualifying which level of access is granted to which agent. From
the semantic point of view, the gap between system of reference, model and
implementation suggests that a layer of complexity is added by simulations being
different technical artefacts than their models: in this case, our analysis should
consider whether the implementation is posterior to the model and whether
the relation is one of isomorphism, analogy or just similarity. For the temporal
characterization, a simulation compared with an underlying (theoretical) model,
for which it acts as inferential engine, will import a different notion of time and
the relation between the temporal representation of the process of interest at
the two levels needs to be addressed. The last aspect, concerning the distinction
between applicability in practice and in principle must be considered in view of
the design and the implementation.
2.1 Positions on Agent-based Simulation
A similar tripartite positioning of views can be identified in the literature on the
epistemology of agent-based computer simulations, with particular attention to
their explanatory power.
A first position11 maintains that artificial models based on agents cannot
provide full explanations of the phenomena they investigate, because their mod-
els cannot be validated. In particular, it is not possible to exert explanatory
potential from the agents’ behavioural rules applied in a precisely specified envi-
ronment. These rules could not exclude other sets of rules generating the same
explanandum, as well as from agents defined by different properties. Hence,
simulations have none of the essential qualifications of the potential sources for
evidential support: direct observation, well-confirmed theory, or results from
externally valid behavioural experiments. What simulations cannot provide,
therefore, is ground to believe that the differences between the experiment and
the target system do not create an error in the transfer of results from one to the
other. At most, computer simulations can provide candidates or contributions
to explanations, and in general are not useful because too permissive. Here the
problem of epistemic opacity returns in the form of a critique of permissible
generalizations through simulation.
An intermediate position maintains that agent-based simulations are ex-
planatory but do not provide predictions:
“In the social sciences, [in] generative explanation [...] macroscopic
explananda [...] emerge in populations of heterogeneous software in-
dividuals (agents) interacting locally under plausible behavioral rules
11Exemplified in [9].
6
[...]. I consider this model to be explanatory, but I would not insist
that it is predictive.”12
What this specific type of simulations can offer is to guide data collection, to
create abstractions capturing qualitative behaviours, to suggest analogies for the
identification of correct models and finally to help rising new questions directing
research. It is notable here the stress on the role that simulations have in shaping
the model of analysis, not only in explaining it.
A final approach maintains a positive stand towards the novelty represented
by agent-based modelling and simulation in their relation with experimental sci-
ences and the ability to provide explanations for them.13 This approach strongly
criticizes the first one for making any abductive inference from simulation, iden-
tifying limits that are general of the social sciences (like data inputting, partial-
ity and unreliability) as proper of agent-based modelling. While this approach
rejects the capacity of agent-based modelling to provide causal explanation, it
identifies in mechanistic explanation the result of simulation:
“Seeing the social sciences as concerned with mechanisms means to
not allow ‘black-box explanations’ such as statistical correlations. Al-
though statistical correlations can be used as evidence for causal as-
sociations, they are not an explanation in themselves as they do not
lay open the ‘cogs and wheels’ operating to produce the phenomenon
in question. [...] A mechanism approach neither reduces social en-
tities to physical entities nor sees social mechanisms as the same as
physical mechanisms.”14
By the use of mechanisms, i.e. through the identification of a set of patterns
in particular contexts with associated entities and activities at work, agent-
based modelling offers the ability to generate predictions which can be tested in
experimental settings. Also, when predictions turn out to be false, mechanisms
are revisable for local faults. In summary, according to this last view:
• Data problems are shared by all approaches to social sciences;
• Retro-fitting is required by the dynamics of running the model, but it does
not mean falsification;
• Level-distinctions are required by agents’ behaviours, but they are only a
part of the explanation;
• Mechanistic explanation accounts for functional explanation as well and
helps us generate predictions and identify faults.
Here again, we wish to stress the acknowledgement of a dynamic relation be-
tween simulation and model (retro-fitting) which seems to question the priority
12See [6, sec.1.10].
13See e.g. [5].
14See [5, sec.2.7].
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order between the two, or at the very least to illustrate the different influence
that agent-based simulations (and MAS in particular, as we will argue) seem to
exert on the design of models.
This brief review shows that the variously held positions on the epistemo-
logical novelty of computer simulations in general rely on one main assumption:
there exists a system of reference which requires an explanation, from this sys-
tem a model is extracted by abstraction and as such its definition is prior to
the implementation in a simulation for explanatory purposes. This assumption
seems to be much weaker in the debate on the epistemological and method-
ological basis of agent-based simulations. One aim of the following sections is
to argue that such an assumption is especially misleading in the case of the
artificial sciences, like network theory and robotics. We argue that in these
contexts, only in a partial sense one can talk of a model defined prior to the
implementation. While all modelling exercises are influenced by the results of
experiments, we argue that the explorative nature of simulations strongly con-
tributes to shaping the model itself when such a model is an artificial one which
is aimed at for optimal results design. On this basis, our quest will be to de-
termine a minimal epistemological committment for agent-based simulations in
the artificial sciences. This will also allow us to return to the arguments and
critiques exposed in this section.
3 Some examples
In this section we want to provide some examples to compare the working rela-
tion between model and simulation as it happens in both natural and artificial
sciences. Our claim is that in the case of the natural sciences, this relation is
more static, with a given computational model from which the analysis starts
and which is then explored through the design and use of (computer) simula-
tions. On the other hand, in artificial sciences like robotics and network theory
and analysis, the dynamics between the studied phenomenon, the constructed
theoretical model of such phenomenon and the simulation of the model is very
different. In particular, we argue that in such cases:
1. an artificially designed and constructed model establishes the reality of
reference; in the strongest case, this can be a formal model (e.g. a logic);
2. the implemented simulation feeds back into the model design: in this
sense, the model of reference is not a given structure to simulate, but it is
dynamically redefined by the results provided by the simulation;
3. all resulting properties (of both model and implementation) are limited in
applicability to a limited class of systems they help shaping: while in the
natural sciences certain behaviours can be sometimes applied to a large
class of systems that share certain structural properties (e.g. defined by
the same physical or biological properties), in the artificial sciences there
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are often stronger initial constraints established by the intended applica-
tion and defining the model of reference and guiding its implementation;
the set of systems that share the same initial constraints is often very
limited.
We argue that the conceptual priority of the theoretical (mathematical) model
over the simulation is only partial. The definition of a logical or mathematical
model as the first step in this process is an abstraction on reality: what the
modeller does in this case is to select a set of axioms and rules which provide an
interpretation of the model assumptions under which the analysis is performed.
The application of rules to the axioms (i.e. syntactically the definition of a
given set of derivable sentences, or semantically a consequence set) defines the
expected validities of that model, i.e. the model prediction. While this process
in the definition of a logic can be shared between modellers of natural and
artificial phenomena, the former ones are constrained by the model assumptions,
as these are what is to be modelled in the first place. Instead, provided some
actual constraints that the designer of an artificial model needs to preserve in
view of the intended application (e.g. the environment of interest, the available
technology used, etc.), her initial model assumptions are often stronger than
those required: the simulation then can be used not just to predict behaviours of
the given model, but rather to tune the model assumptions in order to obtain the
intended behaviours. The ability to manipulate the simulation offers freedom in
the design of the actual agents, and this provides guidance for optimal results.
To support these arguments, we briefly describe below a known case in
physics and two cases in multi-agent systems. Thereby, we hope to provide
supporting evidence to identify essential principles for an epistemological foun-
dation of simulation in the artificial sciences.
3.1 An example of computer simulations in physics
Consider, as an example, a computational simulation of the orbital motion of
a planet around the sun and the corresponding implementation on a computa-
tional system.15 Such simulation will require:
• the choice of appropriate coordinates (e.g. the angle and the distance be-
tween the centers of the Sun and the Earth, with appropriate abstractions
like the rotating of the Sun around its mass);
• the selection of the relevant definitional equations (e.g. for kinetic energy,
potential energy, gravitational constant and Lagrangian equation);
• the determination of significant and useful known equation for derivability
purposes (e.g. the Euler-Lagrange equation and appropriate derivatives);
• the inference of relevant equations (e.g. the equations of motion);
15For a concrete example, see e.g. https://evgenii.com/blog/earth-orbit-simulation/.
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• the computation of the values of interest (e.g. of angle and distance at
some point).
The initial conditions of the system are set to some significant value (e.g.
the average distance between the two bodies), with the first time derivative and
speed set to zero, an arbitrary initial value for the angle and a fixed angular
speed. The simulation of the orbital motion then consists in successively com-
puting position and velocity at discrete time intervals based on the given initial
conditions and the chosen relevant equations. The outputs are then represented
as the planet’s motion, converting the atemporal properties of the mathematical
model in the temporal computation of the simulated movement: this, accord-
ing to Humphreys, represents the relation between the drive and constraints
of experiments in the physical sciences by the development of tractable math-
ematics. Always according to Humphreys, the temporal nature underlying the
target system is reflected by computer simulations, despite their limitations,
while the representation offered by theories and models is more limited in this
respect.16 In doing so, the simulation resembles instruments in allowing humans
amplifying their epistemic reach beyond what is for them naturally feasible.
3.2 An example of computer simulations in network sci-
ence
Consider an agent-based model of ideal information distribution in networks of
agents. The model can be formulated first at the abstract level as a logical sys-
tem of axioms and rules establishing respectively the properties and behaviour of
agents, then translated to an algorithmic protocol and implemented in a simula-
tor. The analysis of the network can be concerned with problems like: conditions
for consensus-reaching transmissions; epistemic costs induced by confirmation
and rejection operations; the influence of ranking of the initially labelled nodes
on consensus; complexity results.17
To start with, it is essential to note here that an investigation of this kind
does not have an absolutely stable phenomenon to account for: there is no
observed system whose behaviour is modelled and reproduced through simula-
tion. Instead, several network topologies can be simulated to analyse different
models of information transmission to determine which one is the most effec-
tive to maximise a certain property (e.g. consensus in the network) and under
which conditions a behaviour with certain characteristics occurs (e.g. trust in
information coming from nodes with higher ranking).
16See [14, p.109].
17In [20] such a model is offerd where relations are characterised by positive and negative
trust. Several topologies of networks are explored, where agents are ranked and have differ-
ent epistemic attitudes, roughly corresponding to lazy agents (accepting information without
control) and sceptic agents (accepting information under a computational cost corresponding
to a verification process). Positive trust is a property of the communication between agents
required when message passing is executed bottom-up in the hierarchy, or as a result of a
sceptic agent checking information. Negative trust results from refusing verification, either of
contradictory information or because of a lazy attitude.
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The second observation concerns the formal model. The design of a logic
aims at determining necessities in the model, i.e. formulas expressing properties
that should always be displayed by the model (conclusions) whenever the cor-
responding initial conditions (premises) hold. As such, a logic is also a limiting
tool, in that such validities are always bound to the axioms or rules defined.
This model is not a reference to be reproduced by the simulation, it is rather an
idealised benchmark against which to compare the results of the experimental
runs of the simulation. Values matching against the provable formulas of the
calculus can be interpreted as a confirmation of the simulation with respect to
the formal model, rather than one of the model against some outside reality.
When experiments provide values that conflict with the formal results, these can
be seen as properties of the current implementation which are not in the scope
of the formal model. Note that this latter case does not necessarily mean that
those behaviours are always undesirable. In the context of properties optimiza-
tion (e.g. when one aims at knowing under which conditions it is easier to obtain
consensus), the simulation provides exploratory information with respect to the
model. It is possible that a series of simulation runs offers an indication that
a certain intended behaviour is not covered by the formal properties designed
by the logic, and so certain choices are made to modify the latter in order to
accommodate the desired results. If this happens, the designer typically moves
back to the formal model, to modify rules and axioms in order to provide the
intended behaviour: this can also happen in the simulation first, i.e. by im-
plementing this in the code, checking what the resulting model offers and then
translating it at the higher level of abstraction provided by the formal model.
Differently from other explanations of the model-simulation relation, our
understanding refers to a strong initial model formulated as a logic with valid or
refutable properties. The logic can either be used as a practical benchmark (i.e.
this formula in the logic is derivable and any implementation of the logic should
preserve it) or as a variable system of hypotheses (i.e. the behaviour in simulation
is desirable, hence we should change the logic so as to accommodate it). This
seems to be a fairly different understanding than the notion of observable system
which needs to be modelled by simulation in order to be explained.
3.3 An example of computer simulations in robotics
As a second example, consider a classical problem in swarm robotics: an un-
supervised community of robotic agents relying only on local rules to explore
the world and communicate to other agents, until a member of the swarm can
assess that a certain property φ holds or not for the world, and on that basis
trigger a collective action. Also in this case, the development can start from a
logic, followed by its implementation in a simulation to provide an experimen-
tal setting in which to test the validities of the logic and verify which further
properties can be added to the model.18
18For example, in [2] this problem is treated in terms of a multi-agent temporal logic of
weighted beliefs, with rules for distributed knowledge formation and conditional action.
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A first observation on such an example concerns a possible deviation of
the implementation from the formal model in the representation of the agents’
memory. While in the formal model one looks at formal structures (e.g. logical
derivations) to establish at which point in the derivation a certain proposition
holds true; in the implementation, the agents’ memory can be represented as
an hashmap table to record their computed beliefs. In other words, while the
formal model requires memory to be extracted from properties of its structure,
the simulation makes this a property of agents.
Another interesting observation concerns the temporal dynamics of the model,
a point already stressed by Humphreys. A formal logic can express time evo-
lution as a set of indices on propositions or as predicates. In a simulation like
the one referred here, timestamps can be used to indicate the starting of the
swarm action, the reaching of a given threshold, the reaction to such threshold
being obtained and the termination of the action. This implementation is an
abstraction on a continuous perception of time in the real world. In other words,
in order to structure and render the results intelligible, a fictional and less con-
tinuous notion of time for the agents can be created in the simulation, such
that it can help identifying characteristics of interest of the constructed model.
Notoriously, this is a problem affecting several modelling techniques and many
analytical methods that focus on the equilibria of a model are unable to account
for the dynamics leading to them. These models also lack a clear correspon-
dence to real time, but this weakness remains hidden. In general, models that
might lack a meaning of time often allow at least to derive hypotheses about the
relative duration of processes and to compare process durations under different
parameter conditions.19 The present observation, nonetheless, does not repre-
sent a critique to the treatment of time by formal models in general, but rather
a consideration on the artificiality of formal models in expressing appropriate
continuous and layered notions of time, more easily modelled by the simulation.
In this sense, the latter offers a better and more reliable analysis of this property.
Finally, and similarly to what happens with temporal properties, also epis-
temic properties (like beliefs) can be expressed in simulation by numerical val-
ues on properties holding for family of agents, which can be modified depending
on applications, but can also be investigated separately for different groups of
agents. Belief degrees can be arbitrarily set to determine when agents start
performing actions, thus indirectly determining the state of their environment.
These design choices concern mainly the intended investigation, but are not
dictated by some fixed model of reference that the simulation has to faithfully
represent: on the contrary, it is the simulation which can help assessing which
of the several possible parameters is the most helpful in reaching the intended
optimal results.
19I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for this specific comment.
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4 On Artificial Models and their Implementa-
tions
The observations extracted from the two examples above in agent-based simu-
lation, and for MAS in particular, are useful to formulate some remarks on the
nature of the relation between models and implementation.
A standard way to define a simulation in its narrowest sense is by referring
to the program that is run on a computer and that uses step-by-step methods
to explore the approximate behaviour of a mathematical model: usually, this
corresponds to a model of a real-world system. On the contrary, in the type
of systems we have considered, the target is only a hypothetical system to be
engineered. This means the model has properties that are designed rather than
discovered: for example, the temporal evolution of the system is determined by
possibly ad hoc thresholds and parameters. The corresponding simulation is
developed to obtain the optimal (and not in some sense real) configuration of
the intended model. Moreover, as we have seen, it can be the simulation to offer
insights on the features that the model has to take into account.
This seems to suggest that agent-based simulations for the artificial sciences
cannot be included in a famous definition by Humphreys:
“any computer-implemented method for exploring the properties of
mathematical models where analytic methods are not available”.20
Humphrey’s narrow definition of simulation appears problematic in the context
of the sciences of artificial: it assumes the existence of a static mathematical
model, whose properties can be explored by the computer implemented method,
and because an analytic one cannot be provided. If one accepts the method-
ological process illustrated by the two examples above, the simulation does not
just explore the model but rather it contributes to its design; hence, a full defini-
tion of the model assumptions are not conceptually prior to the simulation, but
rather results from the analysis of the model predictions (at any given stage of
its design) and their feeding back into the model assumptions, until the optimal
design is reached. The narrow sense of simulation given by this definition seems
in this sense unsatisfactory.
A broader definition of simulation notoriously refers to a comprehensive
method for studying systems, which includes:
1. choosing a model;
2. finding a way of implementing that model in a form that can be run on a
computer;
3. calculating the output of the algorithm;
4. and studying the resultant data (possibly aided by some visualization
technique).
20See [12, p.500].
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The crucial difference with the cases mentioned above is that there is not neces-
sarily a target system for which inferences are to be drawn through the execution
of the simulation. In our case, the presence of a logic underlying the implemen-
tation allows to establish which inferences are valid, and hence which instances
of the model would be ideal. The task is then to find out which of these validities
can be satisfied by an implementation, assuming it is possible (if not likely) that
such implementation might not reflect all the properties of the artefact model.
As illustrated above, sometimes the execution of the implementation provides
insights that feed back in the design model, thus allowing to adjust it.
The first immediate consequence is on the notion of reliability. Consider the
following remark by Winsberg:
“Successful simulation studies do more than compute numbers. They
make use of a variety of techniques to draw inferences from these
numbers. Simulations make creative use of calculational techniques
that can only be motivated extra-mathematically and extra-theoretically.
As such, unlike simple computations that can be carried out on a
computer, the results of simulations are not automatically reliable.
Much effort and expertise goes into deciding which simulation results
are reliable and which are not.”21
In the case of simulations in the artificial sciences, the relation with the model
is dynamic, and the reliability of the implementation cannot be asserted only
by comparison with the model.
An intermediate position in the literature understands computer simulations
to be about the use of computers to (approximately) model a system (either real
or hypothetical). Then a simulation is any system that is believed, or hoped,
to have a dynamical behavior that is similar enough to some other system such
that the former can be studied to learn about the latter. According to this view,
a simulation
“imitates one process by another process. In this definition the term
‘process’ refers solely to some object or system whose state changes
in time.”22
A more comprehensive definition, taking into account the above constraints, is
due to Humphreys:23.
Definition 1 (Simulation) A system S provides a core simulation of an object
or process B just in case S is a concrete computational device that produces,
via a temporal process, solutions to a computational model [. . . ] that correctly
represents B, either dynamically or statically. If in addition the computational
21See [24, p.111].
22See [11, p.83].
23See [14, p.110]. With core simulation Humphreys refers to the temporal part of the com-
putational process, which differentiates it from the underlying model consisting of atemporal
logical or mathematical representations.
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model used by S correctly represents the structure of the real system R, then S
provides a core simulation of system R with respect to B.
Our question is whether this definition matches the intuition of the type of
simulation theory and practice illustrated by the examples above. One limita-
tion seems to be the unidirectionality of the process, whereby the simulation is
understood to provide computable solutions to the model offered by B of the
system R. The aim of the next section is to formulate epistemological principles
that can suggest a rephrasing of the above definition for the specific case of
artificial systems.
5 Epistemological Principles for Simulation in
the Artificial Sciences
In the present section we formulate a number of epistemological principles to
clarify and support the observations made above. These principles reflect the
methodological approach of the Philosophy of Information [7] which subsumes
that the analysis of any system is expressed in terms of semantic data. The
methodology of the Philosophy of Information can be summarised by the fol-
lowing principles:
Principle 1 (Minimalism) Models should be controllable, implementable, pre-
dictable. Problems are relative to a given problem space.
Principle 2 (Levels of Abstractions) Models are relative to a set of inter-
preted variables; several Levels of Abstractions (LoAs) over the same set of
observables are possible (part of a so-called Gradient of Abstraction - GoA); a
LoA allows to analyse the system and elaborate a related model.
Principle 3 (Constructionism) Because the model is constructed, it can be
controlled.
Let us briefly consider these principles. The duality between model and
reality is given by the epistemic status of an external observer with respect to
data: the observer is the privileged knower of the model in virtue of being its
creator; this act of creation invests the knower with epistemic abilities: the
model can be controlled, implemented and is predictable. The design of the
model needs to be restricted to a given set of variables of interest in order
to be functional. Accordingly, the selected LoA establishes the limits of the
observer’s ability to modify the reality and to control phenomena in it: the
model is the only element that can be directly controlled. Discovery proceeds
from the constructed model to the reality, not the other way around. As the
exploratory activities of the observer are limited to the model, any epistemic
statement concerns only the model and refers to reality only in an indirect
way. Other associated principles concern the conceptual economy that a good
modelling activity should always guarantee: resources defining the model should
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be no more than those used to analyse its results; inferences from the model
analysis should not be generalised beyond the limits of the model itself.
In the remaining of this section, we shall illustrate how these principles are
satisfied in the context of our analysis, organising our arguments in three main
areas:
1. the relation between reality, model and simulation;
2. the verification of the simulation and the validation of its model;
3. the explanatory ability of simulations.
5.1 Designing the model to understand reality
One central aspect in the epistemology of computer simulations understood in
their broad sense is the relation between the implemented simulation, its model
and the modelled reality. It is a generally accepted view that the modeling pro-
cess often reveals relationships with – and helps our understanding of – reality:
in other words, constructed models allow to qualify relationships between some
elements of the reality which would otherwise remain hidden. In this sense,
the simulation of a complex situation often provides a solution to a problem
formulated in the space of that situation, even if it is not an analytical but a
numerical solution, created by a computer. To this aim, the reliability of the
results provided by a simulation standardly has to go through the design of a
good model.
The standard theoretical approach to building a good model consists in start-
ing from observations of the real world, transform them in formal expressions,
implement the formalization in a system that allows to analyse the dynamic
aspect of the model (eventually in the code of some simulation software) and
finally evaluate the results of the simulation and compare to expected outputs:
“the simulations play a key heuristic role in the refinement and de-
velopment of models. In this process, however, a crucial constraint is
that adjustments in the model have to result in numerical solvability
of the model.”24
In this context, simulations for the artificial sciences are characterised often
by the absence of initial observations. The principle stating that only the model
is known, while the modelled is only hypothesised, assumes here its strongest
meaning: there is no reality to be known, the model produces a possible inter-
pretation of a world to be built.25
In this process, an essential step is the characterization of the level of detail
to implement, directly following from the choice of interesting properties and
24See [13, p.507].
25For example, in the multirobots system from [2], the simulation allows to explore several
possible configurations of reality that can be obtained, in order to choose the one that best
resolves the intended task. Strictly speaking, the model is used to investigate the hypothesis
(also known as Principle of Constructability in [7]).
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behaviours for the agents as a function of the intended application. Formally,
this corresponds to setting the Levels of Abstraction (LoA) one wants to see
realised in the implementation. While often the artificial sciences can rely on
a wealth of data (think of the amount of data that can be extracted from
networks to design optimal protocols to address several issue), it is also not
entirely strange to start from insufficient, incomplete data, up to no data at
all, in the case of an entirely artificial model. Sometimes, the data available is
limited to the environment in which the system is to function, but there is no
data available about the system, which is still to be formulated and implemented.
This means that one almost always faces a sub-optimal understanding of the
working conditions of the system one is trying to simulate, i.e. of its intended
behaviour in that environment. In these cases, a purely formal model (as in our
case) has the aim of providing optimal benchmarks, which can be approximated
through a simulation implementing corresponding rules.
An optimality criterion reflects a balance between too little and too much de-
tail, between too many and too few LoAs. This dynamics of optimal conditions,
expressed by the formal model and approximated by simulation from the sub-
optimal initial understanding conditions, reformulates the standard description
from theories with fewer details and greater generality (potentially useless) to
more detailed potential simulations (of possibly uncommon theories, or imprac-
tical or uninteresting).26 Under such description, a model that accounts for too
few LoAs, and accordingly implements too litte details, is understood as a tool
to explore the behaviour of the system, imposing as little constraints as possi-
ble; the more LoAs and details are added, the more the model is determined
and so the role of the simulation becomes explanatory; a model with a full set
of details (for a given Gradient of Abstraction) becomes descriptive (and hence
predictive) of the behaviour of the system with respect to the set of variables of
interest.
A further clarification is required for the theory under which the model
is constructed. In the process under consideration, there is no assumption of
truth about the theory, only a correctness requirement. Also this dynamics is
expressed in terms of levels of abstraction: the designer chooses which variables
the formal model has to include and the simulation must be able to implement
them. In its exploratory work, the simulation may provide additional variables,
which are in turn to be added to the model. In this sense, there is no stable
homomorphism between model and simulation, and it is possible that properties
expressed by the simulation are not available in the model but still desired by
the designer, and hence added to it a posteriori.
5.2 Verification and Validation as Controllability
In the previous section, we have argued that the standard view on the modelled
reality of simulations should be discarded in the case of the artificial sciences:
our thesis is that a reality of reference should not be assumed in general to exist
26Cf. [16, p.10].
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before and independently of the construction of the model; rather, it should be
intended as emerging from the processes of modelling and implementation.
If this view is accepted, also another aspect of the standard epistemology of
computer simulations fails, namely the two-steps process composed by validation
and verification:
“Verification is the process of making sure that an implemented model
matches its design. Validation is the process of making sure that an
implemented model matches the real-world.”27
If validation is obtained by checking homomorphisms between model and
reality,28 we need to have a full, stable understanding of the simulated system
and as such the simulating model cannot function either as explanatory nor as
predictive: the model needs to be descriptive. In view of such obvious critique,
graded validation can be admitted:
“The existence of an approximate homomorphism is crucial: it un-
derwrites the relevance of the simulation for the system being simu-
lated and, in particular, its use both for explaining events in the real
world and in predicting them”.29
This position30 claims that no ‘perfect mimesis’ is required between simulations
and physical systems. As an alternative, an account of how validation proceeds
can be offered as follows:31
• first testing of low-level submodels are performed, which describe non-
emergent phenomena in the simulation;
• then higher-level systems are considered, including properties of the sim-
ulation that emerge from interactions between submodels; at this stage
simulated versions of controlled experiments are considered.
For the artificial sciences, validation cannot be defined by comparison with an
existing real-world system, as we are working under the assumption that such a
system is shaped dynamically by the explorative indications offered by the sim-
ulation itself. Instead, validation must be understood as the process of checking
that the model abstracted from the current implementation approximates (up
to some admissible degree of variation, see more below on this) the intended
system. The latter can be described as (possibly a subset of) the validities of a
formal model. This means that the appropriate level of abstraction is chosen for
the model, which has to be endowed with the right semantic description and the
appropriate inferential power to extract information for the relevant variables.
This gives us the minimal indication for good model building in this context:
27See [19, pp.30–31].
28This is the view held in [16].
29See [16, p.9].
30Also maintained in [24].
31Cf. [21, p.316].
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Definition 2 (Validation) A model is valid sensu lato if it is:
• valid (sensu stricto), i.e. defined at the appropriate level of abstraction
(semantics);
• correct, i.e. providing the right inferential values to the relevant variables
(syntax).
Verification is usually defined as the test checking that the simulation prop-
erly implements the model.32 In the presence of an idealised formal theory which
sets optimal benchmarks (but it does not reflect a reality to be mimicked), veri-
fication requires unit and integration testing to establish that the program does
what it is supposed to do. This is assessed against the selected parameters of
the formal models that are considered essential for the simulation to exemplify
properties of the system of interest. Here the appropriate criterion of evaluation
is fitness-for-purpose of the simulation, i.e that the simulation encodes the same
(relevant) levels of abstraction of the model, while design choices can be made
to provide the model with characteristics which arise only in simulation. But
the simulation has to reflect also usability, i.e. that a sufficient level of well-
functioning is guaranteed. This process illustrates how the designer in this case
does not aim at discovering a given pre-existing model, but rather at calibrating
or fine-tuning the simulation with respect to a particular context, to increase
its level of fit for the resolution of a given task. To sum up:
Definition 3 (Verification) A simulation is verified if it is:
• usable, i.e. it guarantees a minimal level of well-functioning;33
• fit-for-purpose, i.e. defined at the LoAs appropriate to the corresponding
model.
The combination of (model) validation and (simulation) verification does
not aim at checking whether the theory represents some reality of reference, a
relation usually named confirmation. The combined roles of verification and
validation is to aim at the controllability of the constructed model, i.e. the
ability of changing the parameters of reference and lead the simulation in a
desired direction, or in other words to provide predictability.
5.3 Problem solving instead of Explanation
The principles of Economy and Context-Dependency in the Philosophy of In-
formation state that conceptual resources in formulating the model need to be
less than those used to obtain the result of the model and that the isomorphism
between the model and the modelled reality is local, not global. They help
clarifying our epistemological analysis for the artificial sciences in the context
of the debate on the explanatory power of simulations.
32See e.g. [16, p.13].
33Usability is to be considered weaker than reliability, which substitues truth in [25].
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One aspect of this debate is related to the role of simulations in exploring
the deductive consequences of theories; another one is their role in empirical
sciences.34 In our analysis, we have assumed a formal theory to provide optimal
benchmarking for the simulation’s results. In this sense, simulations respect the
principle of economy set out by the designer in terms of information containment
with respect to the benchmarking offered by the theory. If the simulation is
good at approximating the optimal benchmarking of the model, we can say
accordingly that the design of the model is optimal:
Definition 4 (Optimality) The design of a model is optimal if it maximizes
the amount of correct data inferred from the simulation while preserving the
appropriate level of abstraction.
On the other hand, we have left it open to the simulation to provide the
theory dynamically with new properties: in doing so, the simulation acts as
an empirical experiment, in the special characterization of exploratory experi-
ments.35 In Definition 1, this aspect was captured by the ability of simulation
S to control the intended model B of an artificial system R. In this sense,
simulations reflect a principle of information expansion justified by a local iso-
morphism between experiment and model, i.e. that the experiment cannot be
considered valid in all contexts in which the theory can be. If the simulation
is good at offering useful information without exceeding the limits of its model,
we say that the design of the model is efficient:
Definition 5 (Calibration or Efficiency) The design of a model is efficient
or calibrated if it minimizes the amount of correct data required by the simulation
to be useful while still preserving the appropriate level of abstraction.
Bringing together these two trends of economy and context-dependency, re-
flected by information containment and information expansion, we can recon-
sider the role of agent-based simulation in providing explanation. As we have
given up their role in a theory-driven understanding of experimentation, simu-
lations in the artificial sciences perform in the first place an explorative role in
shaping the model. Only when a stable model is reached (optimal and efficient),
the corresponding simulation analysis can be said to provide an explanation of
such model.36 The role of simulations in the exploratory phase is better ex-
pressed in terms of their ability to solve well-formulated problems that fall
within the benchmarking given by the formal model, and eventually modified
by the recursive design of the simulation. This is, essentially, a characteristic
of the sciences of the artificial, where a computational model can be formulated
but often no system is already available against which the simulation can be
assessed.
34See e.g. [16, p.11].
35The characterization of experiments as exploratory in the artificial sciences and in robotics
in particular is due to [22].
36This position complements the semantic interpretation of simulations given in [1] through
the addition of the essential exploratory phase.
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6 A Novel Definition and Final Remarks
To conclude, in this section we recollect briefly the main aspects of our analysis
to evaluate their impact on the definition of simulation in the artificial sciences.
First, we have highlighted how the relation of representation betwen com-
putational model and the represented object or process has a different, if not
inverted, conceptual order, in that the object or process of reference may not
exist before the development of the model. Second, the confirmation of the
model is substituted by its (dynamic) controllability by the simulation. Third,
model controllability may be construed locally from partial relations within the
simulation and it has to reach the appropriate equilibrium between semantic
expressiveness and inferential power. Finally, the aim of simulation is to pro-
vide solutions to problems formulated in terms of the variables at the levels of
abstraction of interest.
We note that these observations significantly depart from the notion of sim-
ulation considered in Definition 1. On this basis, we offer a tentative definition
of simulation for an artificial system:
Definition 6 (Simulation of an artificial system) A system S provides a
core simulation of an artificial system R just in case
1. S is a concrete computational device implementing a valid and correct
computational model B of R, and
2. S is a verified simulation of a model B, offering a usable and fit-for-
purpose interpretation of the system R, and
3. S controls the intended model B of R, and
4. S provides solutions to problems formulated within the model B of R.
In this paper we have considered the epistemological foundation of com-
puter simulations for the artificial sciences. We have argued how the latter have
a specific characterization, which is not necessarily shared by natural sciences
and which in turn determines our understanding of computer simulations in
their context. In particular, such characterization is due to the peculiar relation
that modelled, model and implementation present in sciences like robotics and
network theory. Our aim has been to illustrate an appropriate epistemological
foundation in terms of the principles formulated within the Philosophy of In-
formation. These principles are identified as knowability and constructability
of the model in terms of appropriate levels of abstraction; controllability and
confirmation of the simulation in terms of fit-for-purposeness and predictability;
and finally economy and context-dependency of the simulation-model relation,
in terms of information containment and information expansion, where problem-
solving is a more appropriate context than explanation to investigate.
Future work in this area will focus on a precise, formal characterization of the
isomorphism relations and their scope between simulation, model and system
of reference. Note that this allows in turn to qualify the proper meaning of a
simulationist theory in the context of the Artificial Sciences.
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